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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON CO 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
SCS FUND, LP and WINSLOW 
ASSET GROUP, LLC, 
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Civil Action File No. 2008-CV-152062 
STEVEN ODOM, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT ODOM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On April 21, 2010, counsel appeared before this Court to present oral argument on Defendant 
Steven Odom's ("Odom") Motion for Summary Judgment. After hearing the arguments made by 
counsel and reviewing the briefs submitted on the motions and the record in the case, the Court finds 
as follows: 
A court should grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 when the 
moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that the undisputed 
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). The moving party need only eliminate 
one essential element of a party's claim to prevail on summary judgment. Real Estate Int'! Inc. v. 
Buggah, 220 Ga. App. 449, 451 (1996). 
Plaintiff SCS Fund, LP ("SCS") is an investment fund. In June 2006, SCS obtained the right to 
purchase the assets of Veri link out of bankruptcy. SCS assigned its right to purchase the Verilink 
assets to Winslow Asset Holdings, LLC ("WAH"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Plaintiff Winslow 





partner, SCS. WAG then entered into a securities purchase agreement (the "Agreement") with Verso 
Technologies, Inc. ("Verso") that resulted in a transfer of the Verilink assets to Verso in exchange for 
$5.8 million in Verso common stock ("the Purchase"). Pursuant to the Agreement, WAG assigned all 
of the Verso stock to SCS almost immediately after the Purchase. Verso is currently in bankruptcy. 
Odom was Chairman of Verso at the time of the Purchase. 
At oral argument, WAG's counsel admitted that WAG has suffered no damages in this case. 
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant Odom on all counts asserted by 
WAG. 
SCS asserts claims against Odom for (1) securities fraud under Georgia law, (2) common law 
fraud, and (3) negligent misrepresentation. Specifically, SCS alleges that Odom made material 
misrepresentations of fact and failed to disclose material information in connection with the Purchase. 
SCS also alleges that in the two years following the Purchase, Odom made material misrepresentations 
of fact in order to convince SCS to hold its Verso stock when, otherwise, SCS would have sold its 
stock. SCS finally sold its Verso stock in April 2008 for $403,165. Because SCS acquired that stock 
in June 2006 for $5.8 million worth of assets, SCS claims a loss of $5,396,835 that it attributes to 
Odom's allegedly fraudulent statements and omissions. 
A claim for securities fraud under Georgia law has five elements: "1) a misstatement or 
omission, 2) of a material fact, 3) made with scienter, 4) on which plaintiff relied, 5) that proximately 
caused his injury." Koegler v. Kransnoff, 268 Ga. App. 250, 254 (2005). Under Georgia law, "fraud 
has five elements: (1) false representation by a defendant; (2) scienter; (3) intention to induce the 
plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) damage to the 
plaintiff." Bogle v. Bragg, 248 Ga. App. 632, 634 (2001). Negligent misrepresentation has tlrree 
elements: "(1) the defendant's negligent supply of false information to foreseeable persons, known or 
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unknown; (2) such persons' reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury 
proximately resulting from such reliance." Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 
267 Ga. 424, 426 (1997). Thus, a misrepresentation is a required element common to all three of 
SCS's claims. 
Donald Slowinski ("Slowinski") is the sole principal ofSCS and since 1984 has been an 
experienced securities professional. He initiated the Purchase and testified in his deposition that he 
conducted considerable due diligence prior to the Purchase. SCS now contends that Qdom made 
certain misrepresentations or omissions prior to the Purchase and that Verso's 2005 10-K was also 
misleading. 
First, SCS alleges that the description of Verso as a provider of "next-generation" techuology is 
a material misrepresentation. Neither Qdom nor the 2005 lO-K assert that Verso is only a "next-
generation" provider; rather it is clear that Verso had next-generation products as well as "legacy" 
products. Thus, the Court cannot find a misrepresentation here. 
Second, SCS alleges that prior to the Purchase, Qdom represented that Verso intended to 
discontinue some of Veri link's product lines. However, the Agreement gives Verso the discretion to 
sell such product lines, but it does not require it to do so. Moreover, any statement about Verso's 
future plans are not actionable because "a 'misrepresentation' presupposes knowledge of the falsity of 
the representation and does not include representations as to future acts or events." Gross v. Ideal 
Pool Coro.,181 Ga. App. 483, 485 (1987). 
Third, SCS alleges that prior to the Purchase, Odom represented that Verso had large pending 
deals to supply equipment to Alcatel and Motorola. There is evidence in Slowinski's and Odom's 





Fourth; SCS alleges that prior to the Purchase, Odom represented that "if V erso' s revenues 
were combined with revenues generated by the Verilink business, Verso had a 'good shot' at being 
EBITDA positive in the third quarter of2006 and that it was a 'lay up' that Verso would be EBITDA 
positive by the fourth quarter of 2006." The Court fmds these alleged misrepresentations cannot 
provide a basis for SCS' s claims because they are both opinions and representations as to future 
events. ReMax North Atlanta v. Clark, 244 Ga. App. 890, 893 (2000); Gross,181 Ga. App. at 485. 
In addition to the alleged misrepresentations discussed above, SCS alleges that Odom failed to 
disclose two pieces of material information prior to the Purchase. First, SCS alleges that Verso's 2005 
10-K failed to disclose Verso's "history of massive technology-related write-offs." However, the 
record shows that such write-offs were, in fact, disclosed in public filings. Accordingly, the Court 
cannot find any omission of material information based on SCS' s allegations regarding nondisclosure 
of "massive technology related write-offs" when the record shows that such disclosures were made. 
Second, SCS alleges that in Verso's 2005 10-K, Odom failed to disclose that Verso engaged in 
"channel stuffmg." In support of this allegation, SCS points to a single occurrence when it claims 
Verso recognized a sale to one of its distributors in December 2005 when such sale should have been 
accounted for in February 2006. The amount of that sale was $514,615.08. Odom denies any 
"channel stuffing" ever occurred. Actionable fraud may be based on "[ s ]uppression of a material fact 
which a party is under an obligation to communicate." O.C.G.A. § 23-2-53 (emphasis added). The 
Court finds that SCS cannot show that an omission about "channel stuffmg" was material. When 
determining materiality, "the question is not whether the information relied upon was 'important' in 
some abstract sense; the question must be determined within the context of a specific decision." 
McKesson Corp. v. Green, 299 Ga. App. 91, 94 (2009). The Purchase at issue in this case was valued 




in the context of this case, the Court finds that a single incident of "channel stuffmg" involving 
approximately $500,000, even if true, is immaterial as a matter of law. The Court also finds that Odom 
was not under an obligation to communicate. "The obligation to communicate may arise from the 
confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case." O.C.G.A. § 23-2-
53. "Absent a confidential relationship, no duty to disclose exists between parties in arms-length 
business transactions." Lilliston v. Regions Bank, 288 Ga. App. 241, 244 (2007); see also, Bogle v. 
Bragg, 248 Ga. App. 632, 636 (2001). There is nothing in the record to show that SCS shared a 
confidential relationship with Odom. Rather, the record shows that the Purchase was an arms-length 
business transaction. 
Turning to SCS' s holding claims, Slowinski, in his affidavit, specifically points to three 
occasions on which he was planning to sell shares of Verso on behalf of SCS. However, in each 
instance, Slowinski alleges that he did not sell because Odom made misrepresentations about Verso 
which caused him to continue to hold the stock. In January 2007, Slowinski alleges that Odom said 
"you are crazy to sell just above $1.00, Verso is positioned to where we've already turned the 
comer ... We could be close to $1.00 per share in earnings in the next few years. This is going to be a 
$20.00 stock." In March 2007, when Slowinski again told Odom he was planning to start selling, 
Odom stated "we're going to have a record year. We're going to sell that crap we don't need and split 
it with SCS like we agreed." And, finally in August 2007, Odom said "we've got record orders in 
hand and I think it is a bad idea to have the largest shareholder selling into this raise. Just hang in 
there." 
In Holmes v. Grubman, 286 Ga. App. 636 (2010), the Georgia Supreme Court answered 
several certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. First, it 
stated that Georgia does recognize fraud claims based on forbearance in the sale of publicly traded 
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securities. Second, it concluded that a plaintiff at trial has the burden of proving that the truth, 
concealed by the defendant, entered the marketplace thereby precipitating a drop in the price ofthe 
security. It cited favorably a Tenth Circuit case (In re Williams Securities Litigation - WCG Subclass, 
558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009) requiring a plaintiff to show that it was this revelation that caused the 
loss and not one of the "tangle of factors" that affect price. 
The January and March 2007 alleged misrepresentations are statements of opinion and hope. 
And certainly, the August 2007 statement is not an actionable misrepresentation. Finally, SCS has not 
met the requirement of Holmes to show that any of these statements caused the loss rather than a 
"tangle of factors". 
Odom's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED against both WAG and SCS . 
..... 
SO ORDERED this 'S' day of May, 2010. 
1="()t\" ELIZABETH E. LONG, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
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